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The purpose of this paper is to analyze what neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert designates by the term 
‘chaos’. I argue that using this term Rickert means infinite manifolds of human life experiences, that 
philosophers have to convert into ‘cosmos’ of theories by using concept formation. Rickert thinks that 
cognition orders chaos. I show that Rickert’s version of ‘chaos’ is different from the ones that were expressed 
by I. Kant, J. G. Herder, F. W. von Schelling, F. von Schlegel, and F. Nietzsche. I also argue that ideas of 
I. Kant influenced the formation of Rickert’s ideas on chaos. Heinrich Rickert uses the term ‘chaos’ in his 
epistemological theories that describe the process of cognition. Rickert claims that chaos is a raw material 
from which a philosopher can form concepts for understanding the world and life. When creating concepts, 
the building blocks of theories, we order this chaos by dismembering it and marking essential relationships, 
separating them from non-essential ones. According to Rickert, ways of scientifically grasping reality such 
as generalizing and individualizing help us dismember and order the ‘chaos’ of our experiences, creating a 
‘cosmos’ of theories. Rickert correlates the terms ‘cosmos’ and ‘form.’ He believes that philosophers have 
to provide the idea of the clear distinction between form and content and have to see, in the same way, 
the distinction between cosmos and chaos. Philosophers, with their concepts, can give form to the chaos 
of experiences of the world and life, that is, they can create theoretical cosmos. Rickert states that only a 
system of concepts can order chaos into cosmos. Concepts that are not part of a system cannot represent the 
world as a whole. They represent only separate parts of the world, thus they cannot create a ‘cosmos’ as an 
ordered whole. Therefore any philosophy must be formed by a system. Another important part of Rickert’s 
ideas on chaos is his thought that ordering chaos has utility for a person. Through this activity we subdue 
the chaos of experiences of the world and life and it gives us the possibility of being oriented in reality and 
to gain mastery over it. 
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У даній статті проаналізовано зміст, який вкладав представник неокантіанства Генріх Риккерт у 
термін «хаос». Як було показано, цей філософ позначав терміном «хаос» нескінченне різноманіття 
життєвого досвіду людини, яке філософи мають перетворювати на «космос» теорій. Риккерт вва-
жав, що в процесі пізнання людина впорядковує хаос. У статті аргументовано, що інтерпретація 
змісту поняття «хаос», яку запропонував Г. Риккерт, відрізняється від тлумачень даного терміну, 
які використовували інші представники німецької філософії – І. Кант, Й. Гердер, Ф. Шеллінг, Ф. 
Шлегель та Ф. Ніцше. Також було показано, що ідеї І. Канта вплинули на формування уявлень 
Риккерта щодо хаосу. Як було продемонстровано в статті, Генріх Риккерт використовує термін 
«хаос» у своїх гносеологічних теоріях, що осмислюють процес пізнання. Риккерт стверджує, що 
хаос – це те, з чого філософ може формувати поняття для розуміння світу. Створюючи поняття 
як складові елементи теорій, людина впорядковує хаос, розчленовуючи його, маркуючи сутнісні 
зв’язки. На переконання Риккерта, такі способи наукового осмислення дійсності, як узагальнення 
та індивідуалізація, допомагають нам розчленувати та упорядкувати «хаос» нашого досвіду, ство-
рюючи «космос» теорій. Риккерт переконаний, що лише система понять здатна перетворити хаос 
на космос. Адже поняття, які не входять до системи, не можуть репрезентувати світ загалом. Крім 
того, було показано важливість думки Г. Риккерта про те, що впорядкування хаосу є корисним для 
людини. Риккерт вказує, що завдяки впорядкуванню хаосу людина здатна орієнтуватися в реаль-
ності та стверджувати себе в ній.
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Хаос в философии Генриха Риккерта
Александр Кулик, Днепровский национальный университет имени Олеся Гончара
В данной статье проанализированы содержание, которое вкладывал представитель неокантианства 
Генрих Риккерт в термин «хаос». Как было показано, этот философ обозначал термином «хаос» беско-
нечное многообразие жизненного опыта человека, которое философы имеют превращать в «космос» 
теорий. Риккерт считал, что в процессе познания человек упорядочивает хаос. В статье аргументи-
ровано, что интерпретация содержания понятия «хаос», которую предложил Г. Риккерт, отличается 
от толкований данного срока, которые использовали другие представители немецкой философии - И. 
Кант, И. Гердер, Ф. Шеллинг, Ф. Шлегель и Ф. Ницше . Также было показано, что идеи Канта повлияли 
на формирование представлений Риккерта по хаоса. Как было продемонстрировано в статье, Генрих 
Риккерт использует термин «хаос» в своих гносеологических теориях, осмысливают процесс позна-
ния. Риккерт утверждает, что хаос - это то, с чего философ может формировать понятие для понимания 
мира. Создавая понятие как составные элементы теорий, человек упорядочивает хаос, расчленяя его, 
маркируя сущностные связи. По мнению Риккерта, такие способы научного осмысления действитель-
ности, как обобщение и индивидуализация, помогают нам расчленить и упорядочить «хаос» нашего 
опыта, создавая «космос» теорий. Риккерт убежден, что только система понятий способна превратить 
хаос на космос. Ведь понятия, не входящих в систему, не могут представлять мир в целом. Кроме того, 
было показано важность мысли Г. Риккерта о том, что упорядочение хаоса является полезным для 
человека. Риккерт указывает, что благодаря упорядочению хаоса человек способен ориентироваться в 
реальности и утверждать себя в ней.
 Introduction
The term ‘chaos’ comes to philosophy from Theogony in which Hesiod narrates that Chaos was the first born. When Plato in 
Symposium and Aristotle in Physics mention ‘chaos,’ 
they refer to Hesiod’s poem. Traditionally philosophers 
interpret chaos as something primordial and contrast 
it with cosmos as the ordered world. One of the most 
interesting versions of this term was elaborated by 
Heinrich Rickert in the twentieth century.
In his Die Philosophie des Lebens Rickert 
claims that chaos exists. He also claims that chaos 
can be converted into cosmos. Given these claims, 
one might expect that when confronted with the 
question of what chaos is, he would adopt one 
of the three versions of ideas on chaos that were 
argued previously by German philosophers. First, 
Kant held in works of his “precritical period” that 
chaos was a pre-cosmic state in the evolution of the 
universe (e.g. Kant, 1755, p. 78). Second, German 
Romantics used the term ‘chaos’ when they wrote 
about ancient mythology and the first attempts of 
philosophers to grasp the absolute (e.g. Schlegel, 
1982, p. 154). Third, Friedrich Nietzsche described 
chaos as “the zero degree of Being” (Haar, 1998, 
p. 82). But these three interpretations are not what 
Rickert writes. He writes, rather, that chaos consists 
of infinite manifolds of our experiences of the world 
and life. 
Literature review
Rickert’s ideas about chaos have usually 
remained unnoticed. The majority of interest 
in Rickert has revolved around his theories on 
values (e.g. Krijnen, 2001; Oaks, 1988), cultural 
sciences (e.g. Bohlken, 2002), social concepts (e.g. 
Dewalque, 2016), the status of philosophy (e.g. 
Staiti, 2015), issues of ethics (e.g. Centi, 2015), 
and religion (e.g. Crowe, 2010). Only in a few 
papers do researchers (e.g. Zijderveld, 2006) pay 
some attention to Rickert’s ideas on chaos. I have 
not found any that focused on this issue. This is 
unsurprising for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, applying the term ‘chaos’ has no 
comparison among neo-Kantian thinkers. 
Philosophers of Marburg neo-Kantianism, 
Rickert’s colleagues in Heidelberg neo-Kantianism, 
representatives of other groups of neo-Kantians, 
as well as researchers of neo-Kantianism do not 
address chaos. Secondly, Rickert used the term 
‘chaos’ extensively in only one of his important 
writings, Die Philosophie des Lebens. Customarily 
this book does not arouse researchers’ interest 
as much as his other writings: it has not even 
been translated into English. There are two books 
in English of translations of Heinrich Rickert’s 
writings now: Science and History: a Critique of 
Positivist Epistemology (1962) and The Limits of 
Concept Formation in Natural Science: A Logical 
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Introduction to the Historical Sciences (1986). 
Neither contains a translation of Die Philosophie 
des Lebens. Thirdly, the influence of Rickert’s ideas 
about chaos on other philosophers is undiscovered. 
Researchers rightfully argue that Rickert exercised 
a profound influence on generations of theorists in 
a host of disciplines, namely on Martin Heidegger, 
Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch and 
others (e.g. Crowe, 2010, p. 617). But Rickert 
certainly influenced these thinkers with his more 
famous concepts, not with his ideas about chaos.
The appearance of the term ‘chaos’ in Rickert’s 
philosophy is puzzling. Rickert does not use the 
word ‘chaos’ at all in the majority of his writings. 
But in Die Philosophie des Lebens he suddenly uses 
‘Chaos’ 13 times (Rickert, 1922, p. 14, 16, 53, 148, 
149, 172, 181, and 182), the term ‘Lebenschaos’ 
[chaos of life] 3 times (Rickert, 1922, p. 45, 140, 
and 182), ‘Weltchaos’ [world chaos] and ‘chaotisch’ 
[chaotic] twice each (Rickert, 1922, p. 14, 45, 
46, and 181), and the word ‘Wertchaos’ [chaos of 
values] once (Rickert, 1922, p. 140).
The Purpose of the Research
The question provoked by the appearance of 
the term ‘chaos’ in Rickert’s philosophy and by the 
originality of his version of chaos is as follows: what 
exactly does Rickert mean when he claims that there 
is chaos? To answer this question, it will be helpful 
to analyze Rickert’s ideas on chaos in the context of 
his epistemological theories. It will also be useful 
to compare his ideas about chaos with the ideas of 
other German philosophers who wrote about chaos, 
namely Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, Friedrich von 
Schlegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
The Main Material
Chaos and Rickert’s Theory of Concept 
Formation
In the writings of neo-Kantians, as Christian 
Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler have convincingly 
argued, “philosophy is not reduced to epistemology, 
but epistemology functions as the philosophia 
prima” (Krijnen and Zeidler, 2012, p. 232). 
Rickert’s ideas on chaos are no exception. He uses 
the term ‘chaos’ when he examines epistemological 
issues. For instance, he writes the following: “For 
a man of theory, free from any extrascientific 
[außerwissenschaftlichen] evaluations, at the 
beginning of investigation, that is regardless of any 
understanding, the world appears not as a world in 
the meaning of cosmos, an ordered whole, but as 
chaos, depiction of which is practically impossible, 
and as we have seen, it is useless in a theoretical 
sense, because it would lose cognitive importance, 
even if we were able to do it” (Rickert, 1922, p. 148, 
my translation).
Rickert stresses that philosophy has only one tool 
for understanding the world. This tool is concepts. 
He believes the aim of philosophy is to possess the 
world by concepts, organize and unambiguously 
define it. In Die Philosophie des Lebens he uses the 
metaphor of building a house out of bricks when he 
wants to illustrate a process of creating theories. He 
writes that a man has to build the house, has to live 
in it, and has to watch the world from this house. 
According to Rickert, if a theory is a house, it must be 
built by sound building blocks, that is, by concepts. 
We can not use sensations as building blocks, 
because such material is poorly adapted for creating 
a theory. Rickert believes that our experiences of 
the world are chaos. Before building a theory we 
have to do some pre-construction activities, that is, 
concept formation. The chaos of experience is only 
a raw material of concept formation. We should 
form building blocks from parts of this chaos.
 Rickert defines a concept as a combination of 
essential parts of reality. He argues that a concept 
does not reflect all parts of given reality, only some 
of these parts, although they are essential ones. 
Rickert regards cognition as a transformation, not 
as a literal reflection of an external world. In the 
process of cognition using concepts, we designate 
essential relationships, separating them from 
non-essential ones. We dismember and order the 
chaos of the infinite manifolds of our experiences 
by this process of designating. Developing 
Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and 
idiographic judgments, Rickert points out that 
there are two ways of grasping reality: generalizing 
[generalisierende Auffassung] and individualizing 
[individualisierende Auffassung]. Both help us to 
order ‘chaos’, creating ‘cosmos.’
It is important that Rickert uses the term ‘chaos’ 
in his Die Philosophie des Lebens, in which he 
criticizes thinkers of Lebensphilosophie [philosophy 
of life] such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel, 
and Wilhelm Dilthey. Against these philosophers 
he contends that they reject the idea of a clear 
distinction between form and content when they 
do not see a distinction between cosmos and chaos. 
Rickert argues that thinkers of Lebensphilosophie 
are mistaken when they assert that life is both 
cosmos and chaos. He emphasizes that these are 
different things. Rickert writes the following: “The 
scientific work of philosophy loses any meaning if 
it is impossible to work out cosmos by means of 
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theories from the chaos of experiences” (Rickert, 
1922, p.172, my translation)
  Rickert’s theories raise a puzzling question: 
when he writes about chaos does he mean chaos of 
transcendent objects or chaos of immanent ones? 
Dutch researcher Anton Zijderveld has argued that 
Rickert means both: “Rickert believes that the 
concepts of his transcendental philosophy ought to 
remain empty forms which allegedly mold chaotic 
and irrational contents (the transcendent and 
immanent realities) into a rationally understandable 
cosmos” (Zijderveld, 2006, p. 87). But it is clear that 
transcendent things can acquire the status of reality 
for us only after they have been experienced by us. 
In other words, transcendent things can become a 
reality for us only as immanent things. I think that 
when Rickert writes about chaos he means only the 
chaos of human experiences, only immanent reality.
To understand Rickert’s ideas about chaos it is 
necessary to analyze his conception of philosophy. 
Rickert characterizes true philosophy as a reasoning 
of values and also as a science of a whole. 
Rickert believes that philosophy discovers 
general principles through investigating values. 
Philosophy begins, he holds, where problems of 
values begin. Oakes and other researchers have 
pointed out important influences of this theory 
on a lot of thinkers of the twentieth century (e.g. 
Oakes, 1990). Rickert stresses that philosophy 
has to seek values and systematically order them. 
This ordering must have general principles. For 
example, when philosophy orders life, it has to 
give a whole interpretation of the meaning of life. 
Anton Zijderveld has given one such explanation of 
Rickert’s idea about using awareness of values in 
the process of ordering chaos: “Only he who, or that 
which is related to values, can logically be singled 
out from the irrational chaos of facts, objects, and 
living beings as individual, particular, unique” 
(Zijderveld, 2006, p. 178).
Rickert, like other representatives of neo-
Kantianism, believes that philosophy has to be a 
science. Of course, he assumes that philosophy 
cannot be an ordinary science: it must be oriented 
toward the world as a whole, and not merely 
toward this or that specific part of it. Concepts of 
other sciences represent only separate parts of the 
world, but philosophy is a conceptual construction 
that can explain the world as a whole. This task 
can be performed only by philosophy as a system. 
He believes that concepts in philosophy have to 
be a system. According to Rickert, successful 
dismembering of the chaos of experience is possible 
only by a system of concepts. He emphasizes: 
“Only the system enables converting world chaos 
[Weltchaos] into world cosmos [Weltkosmos], so 
we can say that any philosophy has to have the form 
of the system” (Rickert, 1922, p. 14, my translation). 
That is, if philosophy wants to be a science about 
a whole, it has to build a whole ordered system of its 
concepts. Singular concepts designate only singular 
parts of life, not life as a whole. In order to grasp the 
world as a whole, philosophers ought to use a form. 
And a system of concepts has to be this form. It is 
important to be aware of the fact that Rickert gives 
great importance to using a system in philosophy. 
Beatrice Centi has correctly stressed that “Rickert’s 
system is not merely an ordering procedure, but 
rather the instrument, through which philosophy 
unearths what is fundamental” (Centi, 2015, p. 139).
Rickert points out that dismembering and 
ordering the chaos of the world have significant 
utility for people. They give us the possibility of 
being oriented in this reality. Rickert agrees with 
thinkers of Lebensphilosophie that life is inherently 
elusive and obscure. He describes our experiences 
of life as volatile manifolds of sensations that appear 
in an infinite number of combinations. But he claims 
that a philosopher can grasp the world as a whole 
using theories. Rickert contradicts philosophers of 
Lebensphilosophie in saying that a theoretically 
oriented man is able to reflect upon the world in its 
totality. He compares life to a sea and says that we 
need a compass or guiding lights to philosophize 
about life. Ordering chaos by concepts with our 
intellect gives us such a compass and guiding lights. 
I agree with the opinion of A. Staiti that “Rickert is 
arguing that the intellect is the organ of freedom, 
that freedom which alone allows our thoughts to soar 
over the daily concerns and chores of our existence” 
(Staiti, 2015, p. 31). 
Even more, Rickert believes that a man who 
orders chaos gains mastery over life. One subdues 
the chaos of his experiences and this activity enables 
him to set about systematic ordering of the world. 
Rickert concludes that our cognition of the world 
aims to master the world in concepts.
At the same time, it is important to say that 
Rickert’s version of chaos is not as profound in the 
areas of ethics and metaphysics as some modern 
researchers would want it to be. For example, Tano 
S. Posteraro has raised a good question: “What does 
it mean for philosophy to take seriously the chaos 
that haunts and threatens to undermine the fleetingly 
static formations that populate our epistemological 
landscapes?” (Posteraro, 2015, p. 455). Rickert 
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does not analyze such questions. By using the term 
‘chaos’ he does not repudiate the theories traditional 
in German idealism. He does not believe that the 
world is murky, inevitable chaos. He develops 
Kantianism, though he does it with his original 
ideas and theories. Another deep issue was posed 
by Martine Hollins: “How is a personal life to be 
lived when there is knowledge of chaos?” (Hollins, 
1996, p. 29). Hollins states that it is impossible for 
a person to live in constant awareness of chaos. 
But Heinrich Rickert does not think that awareness 
of chaos is a problem. He uses the term ‘chaos’ to 
designate a variety of experiences. And he does not 
think that awareness of the chaotic state of these 
experiences threatens a person. He offers a way of 
ordering chaos and describes dismembering it as a 
clear procedure for doing this. 
Rickert and Kant on Chaos
The primordial meaning of ‘chaos’ used by 
traditional philosophers is also used by Immanuel 
Kant, in the writings of his precritical period when 
he wants to designate an unformed state of nature. 
As is well-known, Kant’s earlier writings are 
primarily contributions to natural philosophy and 
his interest in cosmogony is one of his earliest. 
Kant describes the evolution of nature as a cyclical 
process, including the formation of new worlds 
and the decline of old ones. According to Kant’s 
account, chaos is the raw material of the dispersed 
elements. Nature forms new worlds out of this 
chaos. Kant considers chaos to be not only the 
raw material of world formation but also the result 
of how long worlds have existed. In Allgemeine 
Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels Kant 
writes about the decay and destruction of worlds 
that finally buries all the worlds that have completed 
their term in one total state of chaos. The process 
of world formation starts out of this raw material 
again. Kant stresses that chaos plays an important 
role in the rejuvenation of decayed nature. The raw 
state contains the seed of future worlds that strive to 
evolve out of it. Kant believes that creation is never 
complete; it will never stop. 
Kant also uses the term ‘chaos’ when he analyzes 
the process of Earth formation. In his early works he 
argues that in the beginning the Earth was a wholly 
liquid mass, a ‘chaos’ in which all the elements, 
air, water, etc. were commingled. For example, in 
his Die Frage, ob die Erde Veralte, Physikalisch 
Erwogen he assumes that the separation of the 
elements and the air that are intermingled in the 
“general chaos” [gemeinen Chaos] is not achieved 
very rapidly (Kant, 1839, p. 8). It is clear that Kant 
uses the term ‘chaos’ to designate unformed nature. 
Kant believes that the formation process does 
not need human assistance: nature evolves from 
chaos to cosmos not by human efforts. Kant argues 
in Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels that “Even in chaos, nature is productive 
[fruchtbar]” (Kant, 1755, p. 78, my translation).
In contrast, formation from chaos to cosmos, 
according to Rickert, is a human business. He stresses 
that one creates cosmos from chaos. However by 
chaos Rickert certainly means something different 
from Kant’s version. Rickert and Kant agree that 
chaos is the unformed state and that cosmos is the 
formed state. Further, they agree that chaos can 
be converted into cosmos. But Rickert refuses 
to designate nature as the place and substance of 
such formation. He holds that this formation takes 
place in human consciousness. When Rickert writes 
about chaos he does not describe the primal state 
of the universe or a planet. He means the difficulty 
in cognition of ordering infinite manifolds of 
experiences. 
Immanuel Kant often uses the term ‘chaos’ in 
his precritical period, but he almost never uses this 
term when he begins to examine the capacities and 
limitations of reason. For example, in his Allgemeine 
Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels Kant 
used the term ‘chaos’ 22 times, but in his Critik der 
Reinen Vernunft it is used only once in the preface. 
When Kant uses the term ‘chaos’ he describes 
processes in the realm of matter, not in the realm of 
judgments and reason. Of course, neo-Kantians are 
concerned with theories from Kant’s Critiques and 
cannot use Kant’s term ‘chaos’ in its “precritical” 
sense. Rickert took Kant’s term from books of the 
precritical period, but he interprets it in the spirit 
of Kant’s theories of the period of the Critiques. 
As Daniel Smyth has argued, a distinction between 
sensibility and understanding is the keystone of 
Kant’s critical enterprise (Smyth, 2014, p. 551). 
Rickert continues this tradition when he writes that 
our senses produce a chaos of experiences that can be 
converted into a cosmos by means of understanding.
What causes me to think that, in Die Philosophie 
des Lebens, Rickert develops the term ‘chaos’ of 
early Kant? At first glance, he could have taken 
this term from books by Nietzsche. To answer 
this question I should note that when Rickert uses 
the term ‘chaos’ he does so while also applying 
another term, ‘cosmos.’ Using this pair of terms is 
the feature of Kant’s early works. In the writings of 
Kant’s precritical period, he uses the system of two 
notions, namely ‘chaos’ and ‘cosmos’, to explain 
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the processes of formation of unformed things. I 
think that it is not a coincidence that Rickert does 
the same. Nietzsche usually does not use the term 
‘cosmos’ to designate the opposite of chaos. He 
uses metaphoric expressions for this purpose. For 
instance, Nietzsche discusses tanzende Stern [a 
dancing star] (Nietzsche, 1954a). Moreover, as 
is well-known, Rickert regarded Kant as a model 
philosopher and criticized Nietzsche. Of course, 
Rickert would prefer to develop the notions of the 
first, not the latter. Drawing on this, I argue that 
Rickert develops the term ‘chaos’ of early Kant, not 
of Nietzsche.   
 Rickert and Romantic Philosophers on Chaos
Romantic philosophers addressing the 
unmeasurable and the infinite cannot pass over the 
theme of chaos in silence. I will compare Rickert’s 
version of chaos with those of three German 
Romantics, namely Johann Gottfried Herder, 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, and Friedrich von 
Schlegel.
Johann Gottfried Herder in his Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
describes the idea that the beginning of all things was 
a dark and troubled chaos without limits or form. He 
believes that this idea belongs to a mythology that 
is very ancient, and common to different nations. 
However Rickert does not support the Romantics’ 
interest in mythology. Neither cosmogony nor 
mythology are close to Rickert’s ideas on chaos. 
But another passage by Herder is more interesting 
to compare with Rickert’s ideas. Herder writes the 
following: “In the chaos of beings, which the senses 
point out to him, he has sought and discovered 
unity and intelligence, order and beauty” (Herder, 
1996, p. 136). Herder used the words “Chaos der 
Wesen” [chaos of beings] in this passage (Herder, 
1965, p. 110). This passage seems to be close to the 
epistemological views of Rickert. He stresses that 
our experiences of life appear as chaos, as I have 
said. Nonetheless in the passage above, Herder does 
not write about concept formation. He writes about 
perception of external objects by a “soul.” From 
the chaos of things a soul calls forth a figure, on 
which it fixes its attention. Rickert’s theory about 
dismembering and ordering chaos by concept 
formation is far from Herder’s ideas. 
Another Romantic philosopher, Friedrich 
Wilhelm von Schelling, defines chaos as pure 
formlessness. But he does not think that chaos is 
simply a void. Schelling interprets this formlessness 
as the bounteous and inexhaustible source of forms. 
In his Philosophie der Kunst Schelling writes the 
following: “The inner essence of the absolute, that in 
which all resides as one and one as all, is primal chaos 
itself.31 (Schelling, 2008, p. 88). Schelling used the 
words “ursprüngliche Chaos selbst” [primal chaos 
itself] in this passage (Schelling, 1859, p. 465). Of 
course, Heinrich Rickert does not mean primal chaos 
in his theories. He discusses chaos when he analyses 
contemporary life, not prehistoric times. 
Arguably it would be more productive to 
compare Rickert’s ideas about chaos with another 
passage by Schelling. Schelling holds that when 
ancient thinkers coined the concept ‘chaos,’ it 
was the first attempt to grasp the absolute. That 
is, ‘chaos’ as a philosophical concept is the first 
attempt of philosophers to see a whole. Rickert 
writes that conceptual construction enables a 
man to see life as a whole, as I have mentioned 
above. But Rickert does not discuss the concept 
‘chaos’ as something unique. Schelling insists that 
inventing the term ‘chaos’ to describe the absolute 
was the starting point for philosophy. However 
Rickert believes that only a system of concepts can 
represent the world as a whole. Any single concept, 
for example the concept ‘chaos,’ cannot address 
the challenge adequately.
Moreover, researchers claim that “Schelling 
means the chaos that is beyond or indifferent to the 
difference between chaos and order” (Schuback, 
2005, p. 75). Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback argues 
that Schelling’s ‘chaos’ is not a place before the 
order of places but the inconceivably placeless force 
of an eternal beginning. Rickert’s and Schelling’s 
versions of chaos are certainly different. 
Another Romantic, Friedrich von Schlegel, in 
his Über das Studium der Griechischen Poesie gives 
the following description of ways of converting 
original chaos to cosmos. He writes that original 
“old chaos” [alten Chaos], according to legend, 
“awaited a love [Liebe] and a hatred [Haß] in order 
to separate the different parts and to unify the similar 
ones” (Schlegel, 1982, p. 154, my translation). 
The process of converting chaos into cosmos 
was described by Rickert similarly. He wrote that 
concepts dismember and order chaos. But Rickert 
definitely is not concerned with the original chaos 
of Romantic cosmogonies and ancient legends, or 
poetic metaphors of love and hatred.
Drawing on the results of this comparison, I 
argue that Rickert does not develop the German 
Romantics’ ideas on chaos; he develops Kant’s 
version of the term ‘chaos,’ as I have said.
  Rickert and Nietzsche on Chaos
Friedrich Nietzsche often uses the term ‘chaos’ 
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in his writings. For instance, in Die Fröhliche 
Wissenschaft he claims that “The total character 
of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos – in 
the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack 
of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and 
whatever other names there are for our aesthetic 
anthropomorphisms (Nietzsche, 2006c, p. 219). 
Nietzsche used the words “alle Ewigkeit Chaos” 
[all eternity chaos] in this passage (Nietzsche, 1906, 
174).
 In his Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie 
für das Leben, Nietzsche uses the term ‘chaos’ 
when he discusses the formation of Greek culture. 
He states that the Greeks for many years lived in 
“a chaos of foreign – Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, 
and Egyptian – forms and concepts” (Nietzsche, 
2006b, p. 140). Nietzsche used the words “ein 
Chaos von ausländischen” [a chaos of foreign] in 
this passage (Nietzsche, 1954c, p. 283). Nietzsche 
stresses that Hellenic culture could have become 
an aggregate, but it did not. He argues that the 
Greeks gradually learned how to organize 
[organisieren] this chaos by concentrating on their 
genuine needs, and by letting the pseudoneeds 
die out. As a result of organizing the chaos of 
forms and concepts of various peoples of the 
entire Orient, the Greeks increased that inherited 
treasure of Oriental ideas. Nietzsche claims that 
the Greeks, by organizing this chaos, became the 
first cultured people.
Nietzsche assumes that the Greek example 
of organizing chaos is a parable for individuals, 
for “each of us”. He believes that one “has to 
organize the chaos within him by concentrating 
[zurückbesinnen] on his genuine needs” (Nietzsche, 
1954c, p. 283, my translation.)
In Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Nietzsche claims 
that one can order his chaos. He emphasizes that 
creature and creator are united in a human being: 
“the human being is matter, fragment, excess, clay, 
filth, nonsense, chaos; but the human being is also 
a creator, sculptor, hammer-hardness, observer-
divinity, and the Seventh Day” (Nietzsche, 2006a, 
p. 348). Nietzsche used the words “Unsinn, Chaos” 
[nonsense, chaos] in this passage (Nietzsche, 
1954b, p. 688). Describing the process of ordering 
this chaos, Nietzsche stresses that the “creature in 
the human being” [Geschöpf im Menschen] “must 
be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, 
purified” (Nietzsche, 2006a, p. 348).
Nietzsche regards chaos as necessary to develop 
a person. He states this clearly in the famous phrase: 
“I tell you: one must have chaos in one, to give birth 
to a dancing star. I tell you: you still have chaos in 
you. Alas! The time is coming when man will give 
birth to no more stars. (Nietzsche, 2006d, p. 258). 
Nietzsche used the words “Chaos in sich” [chaos in 
you] in this passage (Nietzsche, 1954a, p. 283).
Although Rickert criticizes Nietzsche, their 
ideas about chaos seem similar. Neither describes 
ordering chaos as a process of nature. They agree 
that a person can perform this process. However 
there are essential differences in their interpretations 
of chaos. Michael Haar has convincingly argued 
that Nietzsche regards chaos as “the zero degree 
of Being” (Haar, 1998, p. 82). Similarly, I argue 
that Rickert interprets chaos as the zero degree of 
cognition.
Rickert writes that we cannot achieve tanzende 
Stern without conceptual construction: “Without 
mastering the chaos of life [des Lebenschaos] with 
concepts, we will not come to any star not to mention 
cosmos” (Rickert, 1922, p. 182, my translation). 
Nietzsche does not write about conceptual 
construction or other epistemological issues of 
the process of cognition. He is concerned with the 
transvaluation of all values and the will to power. 
This is very far from Rickert’s idea about ordering 
chaos to get a true picture of life as a whole.
However, I think that Nietzsche’s writings 
played a certain role in forming Rickert’s ideas about 
chaos. It is interesting that Rickert does not use the 
term ‘chaos’ in the overwhelming majority of his 
important articles and books on epistemological 
issues. For example, Rickert absolutely did not 
use this term in Fichtes Atheismusstreit und die 
Kantische Philosophie: Eine Säkularbetrachtung, 
Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen 
Begriffsbilding: Eine Logische Einleitung in die 
Historischen Wissenschaften, Kulturwissenschaft 
und Naturwissenschaft: Ein Vortrag, Der 
Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einführung in die 
Transzendentalphilosophie, or Zur Lehre von der 
Definition. But Rickert actively uses ‘chaos’ in his 
Die Philosophie des Lebens, in which he criticizes 
the thoughts of philosophers of Lebensphilosophie, 
especially Nietzsche. Arguably Rickert decided to 
give his own “correct” interpretation of the term 
that was important for Nietzsche, as well as give 
his own interpretation of the term “philosophy 
of life.” Nietzsche’s ideas occasioned Rickert’s 
articulation of his own understanding of meaning 
of ‘chaos.’
Nietzsche’s interpretation of chaos does not 
provide a strong distinction between content 
and form. But this distinction was important to 
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the philosophy of Kant, whose theories were the 
ideal for neo-Kantian Rickert. I agree with Anton 
Zijderveld, when he calls Rickert “a loyal follower 
of the great philosopher of Königsberg” in the 
ongoing discussion of the distinction between 
form and content (Zijderveld, 2006, p. 21). In 
his philosophy, Kant used various pairs of terms 
to designate a distinction between content and 
form. One of these pairs is ‘chaos’ and ‘cosmos,’ 
which he used during his precritical period. 
When Rickert criticized the ideas of thinkers of 
Lebensphilosophie in Die Philosophie des Lebens, 
he used this pair of Kant’s notions to articulate his 
opinion, correcting Nietzsche’s understanding of 
chaos. However, Rickert also had to modify Kant’s 
early version of the distinction between content 
and form. He rejects all “precritical” features of 
this version. Rickert refuses to see cosmogonical 
connotations in the term ‘chaos’. Also, according 
to Rickert, this kind of chaos can be ordered into 
cosmos not by nature but by a human by means of 
his consciousness. 
Conclusion
As I have shown, a lot of German philosophers 
used the term ‘chaos,’ namely Immanuel Kant, 
Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Schelling, Friedrich von Schlegel, Friedrich 
Nietzsche etc. But Rickert’s version of this term 
is original because he gave it the meaning that 
corresponds to his own epistemological system.
Rickert and early Kant agree that chaos is an 
unformed state and that cosmos is a formed state. 
They agree, further, that chaos can be converted into 
cosmos. But Rickert refuses to discuss nature as 
the place and substance of this formation. He holds 
that this formation takes place in consciousness. 
When Rickert writes about chaos he does not 
designate a primal state of the universe or a planet 
as Kant did in his early writings. For Rickert chaos 
is a raw material that consciousness uses to create 
a cosmos of theories by means of human reflection. 
According to Rickert, chaos can be ordered into 
cosmos not by nature, as early Kant thought, but 
by a philosopher. Rickert develops Kant’s term 
‘chaos’ from the works of his precritical period, 
and interprets this term in the spirit of Kant’s 
theories of the period of the Critiques with his own 
developments.
I have shown that the use of ‘chaos’ by 
some German Romantic philosophers is close to 
Rickert’s use of the term. Johann Gottfried Herder 
applies ‘chaos’ when he writes about perception 
of external objects by a “soul.” Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Schelling interprets the formlessness of 
chaos as the bounteous and inexhaustible 
source of forms. Friedrich von Schlegel uses 
the term ‘chaos’ when he describes the process 
of converting primal chaos into cosmos. But 
the German Romantics do not use this term to 
designate the process of concept formation as 
Rickert does. Further, Rickert does not address 
the initial chaos of cosmogonies and ancient 
legends, in contrast to the Romanics. However 
the process of converting chaos into cosmos was 
described similarly by Rickert and some Romantic 
philosophers. For instance, Heinrich Rickert and 
Friedrich von Schlegel both hold that chaos has to 
be ordered by means of dismembering. 
Although Rickert criticizes Friedrich Nietzsche, 
their ideas on chaos seem to have some similar, 
important features. Rickert and Nietzsche do not 
describe the process of ordering chaos as one of 
the processes of nature. They both claim that a 
human being can perform this process. However, 
Nietzsche does not address conceptual construction. 
Yet, Nietzsche’s writings played a role in forming 
Rickert’s ideas on chaos. In Die Philosophie des 
Lebens Rickert gives his own interpretation of 
this term that was important for Nietzsche. In light 
of the background of the term ‘chaos,’ Rickert’s 
interpretation becomes deep and interesting for 
understanding the processes of human cognition.
It would be reasonable to continue the analysis 
of Rickert’s ideas about chaos by exploring the issue 
of the influence of these ideas on other philosophers. 
I will do it in other articles. 
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